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RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF CONSENT JUDGMENTS IN PATENT
LITIGATION
The United States patent system seeks to promote scientific and
economic advancement through the stimulus of invention by carving
out a limited exception to the general rule against monopolies) The
federal policy which supports this system mandates that ideas be dedi-
cated to the common good, unless they are protected by a valid
patent. 1 The public, therefore, has a paramount interest in assuring
that patent monopolies meet the congressionally imposed criteria of
patentability, 3 which alone can justify the restriction on public access
' See Lear, Inc. v, Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lead;
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co„ 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945).
At "common law, monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon in-
dividual freedom of contract and their injury to the public." Standard Oil v. United
States, 221 U. S. 1, 54 (1911). Notwithstanding the illegality of monopolies, the English
sovereign had long exercised the authority to grant letters patent "reciting the grant of
some dignity, office, monopoly franchise, or other privilege to the patentee. They are
not sealed up, but are left open (hence the term 'patent') and are recorded in the pat-
ent rolls in the Record Office." A Defier, 1 WALKER ON PATENTS 2 (1937), quoting 13
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BHITANNICA 969 (14th ed.).
The Crown often granted monopolies to the privileged few, who then sold them
to the highest bidder. id. at 6. Continual abuse of the royal prerogative led, in 1623, to
Parliament's enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3 (1623) which
abolished all monopolies, but expressly exempted from such prohibition "any letters -
patent and grants of privilege, for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures ... to be the
true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures ...." 21 Jac. I, c. 3, Part VI
(1623) quoted in, A. Deller, 1 WAI.KER ON PATENTS 20 (1937). In the United States, Arti-
cle I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution invests Congress with the authority "[do
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries
...." Federal statutes enacted in accordance with this authority have been in force since
1790. Id. at 35. The current Patent Code provides that "(wThoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. 101 (1970).
Lear, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brice Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964).
A patent is, in effect, a contract between the inventor and the public. A. Deller, 1
WALKER ON PATENTS 27 (1937). The patentee gives his invention to the community in
exchange for the right to exclude others from making, using or vending the invention.
If an invention does not meet the statutory requirements, there is no consideration for
the grant of the privilege of exclusivity.
'The statutory conditions for patentability include the requirements of novelty
and utility as defined in 35 U.S.C. § § 101 and 102 (1970). In addition, the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented must not "have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
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to a free and open market. 4
Judicial review of patent validity is an essential safeguard to the
public interest." One factor contributing to the significance of such
review is that the U.S. Patent Office has tended to apply relatively le-
nient standards in its determinations of patentability.° This govern-
ment agency often arrives at its decision to issue a patent after an
ex parte proceeding, without the aid of argument by parties interested
in proving patent invalidity.' As a result, "most judges ... think that a
strong well-financed applicant has a pretty good chance of getting at
least some patent claims allowed somewhere along the line." As a re-
sult, flimsy patents are common, requiring judicial review to expose
their invalidity."
A second factor which contributes to the importance of judicial
review of patent validity is the public's dependence on private litigants
to vindicate its interest in stripping an invalid patent of its gov-
ernment-sanctioned monopoly." This private enforcement mech-
anism, however, does not necessarily effectuate federal patent policy.
The patentee, for example, may sue an alleged infringer who posses-
ses neither the resources, nor the desire necessary to go to trial and
fully ventilate the issue of patent validity. As a result, the parties may
negotiate a consent judgment, which typically recites both the validity
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945). See Blonder-Tongue Labortories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found-
ation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971), where the Court noted that "[a] patent yielding returns
for a device that fails to meet the congressionally imposed criteria of patentability is
anomalous." See generally Lear, 395 U.S. 653, 663 (1969); United States v. Bell Tel. Co.,
128 U.S. 315, 357, 370 (1888).
"A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion reached by
the Patent Office." Leer, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). Although the Patent Office has the
primary responsibility for application of the broad criteria of patentability, Congress has
lodged final authority to decide that question in the federal courts. 35 U.S.C. § 141
(1970) (Board of Appeal's denial of a patent application is reviewable in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals.); 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970) (A federal district court may re-
view the validity of an issued patent in an infringement action because patent invalidity
is a defense to an action for infringement. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970), federal dis-
trict courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions arising under the Pat-
ent Code.) See BlOnder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 332 (1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
6 In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court "abserved
a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the
courts." Id. at 18.
Lear, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 . 1. PAT. OH. SOC'Y, 810, 816 (1971).
6
 One claini was recently invalidated as having been anticipated by Euclidian
geometry. Ken Wire & Metal Prods., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 338 F. Supp.
624, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
me The federal government can only challenge patent validity in the case of fraud
on the Patent Office. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 265 (1897).
But q: United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1973), where the Su-
preme Court recognized' the limited authority of the federal government to challenge
the validity of a patent which is directly involved in antitrust violations when the gov-
ernment presents a substantial case for relief in the form of restrictions on the patent.
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and past infringement of a patent. Although the court enters this
agreement as a judgment, thus giving_ it its imprimatur, these recitals
sometimes serve to validate a patent whose invalidity would have been
revealed in a fully contested adversary proceeding. Thus, where the
same parties seek to relitigate the issue of validity, the question of the
degree of sanctity to be accorded a consent judgment in a subsequent
suit implicates countervailing considerations. On the one hand, the
principle of res judicata requires finality, so as to prevent vexation to
the parties and the waste of judicial resources." On the other hand,
federal patent policy, which "requires that all ideas in general circula-
tion be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent,'" 2
 seeks to remove all obstacles to an authoritative test of
patent validity."
The federal policy which seeks to facilitate judicial review of a
patent's validity received the Supreme Court's full endorsement in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins." There, in a contract action for unpaid royalties,
the Court held that a patent licensee was not estopped from challeng-
ing the validity of a patent despite his status as the beneficiary of a
licensing agreement." Justice Harlan, speaking for a majority of the
For a history of the limitations on the federal government's authority collaterally to
challenge the validity of issued patents, see id. at 65-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" The doctrine of res judicata is "founded upon the generally recognized princi-
ple that there must be some end to litigation." 113 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.405
[1], at 628 (2d ed. 1974), quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 733 (1946). Res judicata
thus fosters reliance on judicial action and conserves judicial resources while sparing the
parties the vexation of relitigation and the concomitant possibility of inconsistent re-
sults. Developments in the Law—Res Judicata,.65 H ARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952). At the same
time, however, the permanence of prior judgments may spawn overzealous litigation,
perpetuate bad law and limit judicial flexibility. Id. As a result, res judicata, both in its
general application and in its application to consent judgments, must remain a flexible
doctrine. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669.71
(1944) (failure to interpose a patent misuse defense in earlier infringement litigation in-
volving the validity of the same patent did not foreclose an antitrust claim based upon
patent misuse); cf. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 177 (1942). See
also 113 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.409[5], at 1032 (2d ed. 1974).
Res judicata operates through the principles of bar, merger and collateral estop-
pel. A valid final judgment for the plaintiff on the merits merges the plaintiff's cause of
action. IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405(1], at 625 (2d ed. 1974). Thereafter he
may sue the defendant only on the judgment, and not on the original claim. Id.
Likewise, an in personam judgment for the defendant serves as a judgment in bar, extin-
guishing the plaintiff's original cause of action. Id. at 626. Bar and merger, therefore,
preclude a second suit on the same cause of action, both as to issues actually litigated
and decided as well as those that might have been litigated. Lawlor v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other
hand, "precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior
suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit."
Id.
12 Lear, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). See note 2 supra. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
" Wonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 344-45 (1971).
395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"1d. at 670-71.
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Court, determined that the technical requirements of the contract
doctrine which forbids a dissatisfied purchaser from repudiating his
promises must yield to the public interest in challenges to the patent-
ability of an inventor's claims."' The Court reasoned that the contrac-
tual equities of the licensor do not outweigh "the important public in-
terest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain.""
The Supreme Court's central concern in Lear, then, was the
facilitation of the private litigant's challenge to patent validity." The
lower federal courts have acknowledged this concern by widely apply-
ing the Lear rationale to eliminate other traditional obstacles to chal-
lenges of patent validity." It has not been extended, however, to re-
quire the yielding of the public interest in the finality of fully con-
tested judgments. 2° This comment will seek to pinpoint the proper
In Lear, John Adkins, an inventor, was hired to improve gyroscope accuracy.
After Adkins developed a new method of gyroscope construction, but before the Patent
Office had issued a final decision as to its patentability, the parties negotiated a licens-
ing agreement. Id. at 655-57. During Adkins' drawn out negotiations with the Patent
Office, Lear concluded that Adkins' inventions were not patentable and ceased paying
the royalties required under the licensing agreement. Id. at 659-60. Adkins, on obtain-
ing his patent, immediately brought suit for breach of contract, The California Su-
preme Court held that the doctrine of licensee estoppel barred Lear from raising the
defense of patent invalidity. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 907, 435 P.2d 321,
336, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549-50 (1967).
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the state court's judgment and remanded
for consideration of the validity of the patent. 395 U.S. at 676.
" 395 U.S. at 670-71.
" Id. at 670.
"See id. at 670-71. The Court emphasized that licensees may he the only indi-
viduals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patent's validity and vindicate
the public interest. The Court recognized that "by accepting a license and paying royal-
ties for a time, the licensee may have avoided the necessity of defending an expensive
infringement action during the period when he may be least able to afford one:" Id. at
669. Thus, the Court sought to preserve the licensee's opportunity to mount a legal
challenge to the patent once he was in a position to finance the suit,
Interestingly, much of the Court's reasoning was inapplicable to the facts before
it. Lear, Inc. was a powerful, advantaged licensee who negotiated a license more than
four years before Adkins received his patent, not to avoid the necessity of defending an
infringement suit, but rather to gain the important pre-patent benefit of exclusive ac-
cess to the inventor's ideas not obtained by the typical licensee. Id. at 671. Pending pat-
ent applications are kept in confidence by the Patent Office, 35 U.S.C. II 122 (1970),
whereas the inventor's ideas are made public on issuance of the patent. 37 C.F.R.
1.11(a) (1975).
19 See, e.g., Crane, Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 504 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1974)
(marking estoppel); Coastal Dynamics Corp. v. Symbolic Displays, Inc., 469 F.2d 79 (9th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (assignor estoppel); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Gol-
den State Advertising Co., 444 F.2d 925, 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971)
(no-contest clause in settlement agreement); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical
Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 58 (7th Cir.), cm. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1970) (exclusive licen-
see estoppel). Cf. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 4l0 U.S. 52, 58 (1973) (tsar
rationale is sufficient authority to permit Federal Government a limited ability to chal-
lenge patent validity in antitrust suits.)
" See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 468 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1972); Shat-
terproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., 962 F.2d 1115, 1125 (Gth Cir.), cm. denied,
409 .U.S. 1039 (1972). In Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir.
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placement of consent judgments on the continuum between the Lear
license situation and the fully contested disposition."
Initially, this comment will compare consent decrees with the
licensee estoppel doctrine to determine whether the Lear rationale re-
quires that recitals of patent validity in consent decrees should no
longer preclude further challenge to the validity of the same patent.
It then will analyze the distinction courts have drawn between consent
judgments reciting both validity and infringement, which are given
res judicata effect, and those adjudicating validity alone, which are not
deemed conclusive. It will be submitted that a consent judgment
should not bar a litigant from further challenge to patent validity.
However, the judiciary's determination to prevent litigants from com-
ing to regard the consent process as an idle ceremony is likely to
thwart any change in the trend of the decisions. It is therefore sug-
gested that the distinction between the two types of consent judg-
ments may offer a viable compromise between the competing policies
of finality and authoritative validity determinations, for the distinction
serves in practice to deny conclusive effect to those consent decrees
most likely to result in the protection of spurious patents. The distinc-
tion thus compensates for the absence of an adequate safeguard
against the entry of erroneous decrees; it retains some of the benefits
of res judicata, while minimizing the disadvantages inherent in the
application of the finality principle to consent judgments in patent
litigation.
I. A COMPARISON OF CONSENT DECREES AND LICENSEE ESTOPPEL IN
THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL PATENT POLICY
Consent judgments have usually been accorded full res judicata
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976), the court observed "Nile are aware of no court
which has entertained the suggestion that Lear abrogates the doctrine of res judicata
after a fully litigated result." Id, at 780. Thus, the court reasoned that "[elven though
the degree of judicial involvement is different between a consent decree and a litigated
result, we are not prepared to find that judicial involvement in a consent decree is so
inconsequential as to justify different treatment." Id.
" This continuum, in effect, encompasses the full range of obstacles which may
obstruct a challenge to the validity of a patent. At one end of the continuum are those
obstacles which the courts readily have overturned. See cases cited supra at note 19.
What these obstacles have in common is the fact that they have arisen entirely as the re-
sult of private action and offer no guarantee that the obstacle in fact protects a valid
patent from unnecessary challenge. A license, a settlement agreement and an assign-
ment of a license all originate in an agreement between private parties. Similarly, mark-
ing estoppel arises as the result of action taken by the parties when an alleged infringer
marks its product with the patentee's patent number. At the other end of the con-
tinuum is the obstacle posed by the fully contested judgment of validity which the
courts have refused to overturn. See cases cited supra at note 20. In the case of a Fully
litigated disposition, the resultant judgment does not merely reflect the agreement or
action of private parties, but stands as the pronouncement of the court. This pro-
nouncement, in turn, is based on the full ventilation of the issue of validity. A fully con-
tested judgment of validity, therefore, is likely to protect only valid patents from
further challenge because the litigation would have exposed the invalidity of spurious
patents. 70
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effect, at least with respect to those issues actually adjudicated."
Courts have thus rejected any attempt to characterize a consent judg-
ment as a simple contract between the parties:" "[T]he judgment is
not an inter partes contract; the court is not properly a recorder of
contracts, but is an organ of government constituted to make judicial
decisions and when it has rendered a consent judgment it has made
an adjudication."24 The consent decree's adjudicative function has
been stressed particularly where it concludes litigation which impli-
cates the public interest. 25
 Despite this claim that the consent decree is
adjudicative, there is no requirement that the court, in fact, must ex-
ercise judicial discretion in the entry of a consent judgment."
While the conventional wisdom, therefore, would deny that a
consent judgment was an inter partes contract," as a practical matter,
the distinction in patent litigation is often a purely formal one. In-
deed, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lear, both patent
licensing agreements" and consent judgments 22 typically included
" United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1932); IB J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PieAcrict; 10.409[5], at 1032 (2d ed. 1974). However, consent judgments will
not be given collateral estoppel effect as to issues not concluded by the judgment. Sealol
Corp. v. Flexibox, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 693, 698 (D.D.C. 1965). But see E. Ingraham Co.
v. Germanow, 4 F.2d 1002, 1003 (2d Cir. 1925). Nor will the court accord the judgment
collateral estoppel effect where the subsequent litigation was not foreseeable at the time
of the first suit. IB J. MoottE, Ft;maAi. PR/wilt:1 ,1,i 9.444[1], at 4003 (2d ed. 1974).
23 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). But see PCR Golf Ball
Co. v. Chemold Corp., 361 F. Supp. 187, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (mem.); Sealol Corp. v.
Flexibox, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 693, 697-98 (D.D.C. 1965).
14 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PleAcTicE 0.409(5), at 1030 (2d ed. 1974).
35 See James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178,
185 (1959).
In the case which involves a purely private dispute, where the parties have Full
capacity to contract, the court will not inquire into the merits of their settlement. Risk v,
Director of Ins., 141 Neb. 488, 496, 3 N.W,2d 922, 926 (1942) (plaintiff insured at-
tacked validity of reinsurance agreement). James, supra. In fact, the court may be com-
pelled by mandamus to enter judgment as submitted. See State ex rel. Carmichael v.
Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 482-83, 41 So.2d 280, 282-83 (1949). On the other hand, in the ac-
tion which implicates the public interest, the court may examine the merits and refuse
to enter the consent decree or require the parties to explain and justify their result. See
United States v. Radio Corp, of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942), appeal
dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943) (consent decree entered pursuant to stipulations in anti-
trust suit). Timberg, A Primer on Antitrust Consent Judgments and FTC Consent Orders, 39
BROOKLYN L REV. 567, 568 (1973); Note, 72 FlAkv, L. Rev. 1314, 1316 (1959).
26 In USM Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co,, 184 U.S.P.Q. 476 (N.D. III.
1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1975), for example, the tact that the consent de-
cree had been signed by a judge who was not regularly assigned to the case and had
not participated in any of the pre-trial matters, 184 U.S.P.Q. at 477, was not mentioned
by the court in subsequent litigation as a ground for not deciding its res judicata effect.
524 F.2d at 1099.
22 See notes 23-24 supra.
26
 See, e.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 232 (1892); National Clay
Prods. Co. v, Heath Unit Tile Co., 40 F.2d 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1930). Because the doc-
trine of licensee estoppel obstructed the licensee's challehge to the validity of the patent,
a concession of validity in a license agreement was, in effect, gratuitous,
" See, e,g., Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Sal-T-Bourn Corp., 362 F.2d 317,
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either a concession of the patent's validity or a covenant not to contest
its validity. Lear, however, abrogated the doctrine of licensee estoppel
and thus vitiated the effect of no-contest clauses in license
agreements. 3 ° To date, the Lear court's rationale has not had a practi-
cal impact on consent decrees entered in patent infringement litiga-
don which usually continue to include a provision for the payment of
royalties for prospective use and a concession of the patent's validity. 3 '
The application of the principles of res judicata to consent decrees,
then, would guarantee permanent effect to their recitals of a patent's
validity. 32 This section will examine the features which distinguish
consent decrees from simple licensing agreements in order to deter-
mine whether different treatment of their concessions of validity is
consistent with federal patent policy. It will then analyze the extent to
which this different treatment may give rise to undesirable conse-
quences.
A. Consent Decrees and Licensing Agreements as Barriers to Challenges of
Patent Validity
1. Safeguard against the entry of erroneous decrees
. The court's sanction of the settlement submitted by the parties
constitutes the most obvious distinction between a consent decree and
a simple license agreement. The role of the judiciary in the entry of
such judgment is neither blind nor purely ceremonial. Often the
judge is well acquainted with the merits of the case after overseeing
years of discovery and pretrial conferences.33 In addition, recognition
of the public interest affecting patent litigation has stimulated courts
to take more active roles in reviewing consent decrees submitted by
the parties. 34 For example, judges occasionally have insisted on dis-
321-22 (8th Cir. 1966); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 476 (8th Cir. 1965); Joseph
Freeman & Co., 323 F.2d 636, 637 (1963).
"See 395 U.S. at 670-71.
3 ' See, e.g., USM Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co., 524 F.2d 1097, 1098 (7th
Cir. 1975); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 364 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. 111. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1974).
32 The effect would be permanent insofar as the validity issue arose in a subse-
quent action between the same parties. See discussion of bar and merger principles
supra at note 11.
"See, e.g., Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1392 (2d
Cir. 1973) (3 years of litigation); Business Forrris Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452
F.2d 70, 71 (7th Cir. 1971) (3 years); Kiwi Coders Corp. v. Acro Tool & Die Works, 250
F.2d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1957) (4 years and 2 pre-trial conferences). This is not always
the case. 36.3% of the consent decrees recorded in the period from 1949-1958 were en-
tered within the first six months after the suit was filed. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATEN'rS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMMIEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
86th CONG., 2d Srss., AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS 14 (Comm. Print
1961).
34 , Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent Decrees in
Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 COLUM, L. REV. 1322, 1339 (1974). In addition, there
are informal safeguards against the entry of erroneous decrees. "Patent cases seem to
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missing the suit with prejudice." Further, in some cases they have
clarified the limits on the citation of consent decrees against third
parties36 and have even recognized that a refusal to sign consent
judgments may best protect the public interest."
Despite the view that the issue of validity is in some sense ad-
judicated, and not merely negotiated, in a consent decree, the court's
participation in the settlement process does not guarantee that con-
sent judgments will not validate spurious patents. The expense of pat-
ent litigation, 38 a disproportionate 'share of which is borne by the
challenger, 3 ° increases the likelihood that the parties will reach settle-
ments reflecting factors other than the relative merits of their respec-
tive legal claims. The complexity of patent litigation makes it particu-
larly inappropriate for effective judicial overview of the summary dis-
position accomplished by the parties,'" for even in fully contested
suits, judges sometimes frankly admit their inability to grasp the tech-
nical aspects of the claims." Additionally, there is no guarantee that
decrees will be entered by judges well schooled in the history of the
controversy between the parties.'" Finally, the disparity between the
outcomes of contested and consented dispositions suggests that the
settlement process validates patents which would otherwise be found
invalid: while consent judgments usually support the patentee's
claims,'" litigated patents fare poorly in the federal courts. From 1966
to 1972, for example, 68% of all the patents reviewed in federal ap-
pellate litigation were invalidated." Thus, it would seem that there is
no guarantee that judicial participatiOn will ensure that only valid pat-
ents will be protected by the barrier erected by the consent decree. In
effect, for the purposes of determing patent validity, the consent de-
be assigned to judges who are interested in trying them; presumably such judges are at-
tuned to federal patent policies." Id. (footnote omitted).
"See, e.g., Kraly v. National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 502 F,2d 1366, 1368
(7th Cir, 1974); Brose v. Sears, Roebuck & CO., 455 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1972).
"" See, e.g., Weston Instruments, Inc. v. Data Technology Corp., 64 F,R.D. 100,
102 (N.D. Cal. 1974); I'CR Coll Ball Co. v. Chemold Corp., 361 F. Supp. 187, 188
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
" Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. III. 1971),
red per curiam, 177 U.S.P.Q. 33 (7th Cir. 1973).
3" See text at notes 81-82 infi-a.
"See text at notes 107-117 infra.
'° Significantly, judicial "activism" in the processing of consent decrees has re-
lated primarily to the procedural, and not the substantive aspects of the disposition. See
text at notes 35-37 supra.
41 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 331 (1971).
" See note 26 supra.
43 See,	 USM Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co., 524 F. 2d 1097, 1098 (7th
Cir. 1975); Business Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson. 452 F.2d 70, 7l (7th Cir.
1971), The author's research has not uncovered any case where the parties were seek-
ing to reopen a consent decree which found a patent invalid.
" Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back: Collateral Estoppel in Patent Litigation—A
New Look, 18 VILL. L. Rev, 207, 227 (1972).
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cree, like the license, simply reflects the agreement reached by the
parties.'"
The litigants' access to discovery, which facilitates the appraisal
of their opponents' claims, appears to constitute the only real distinc-
tion between these private processes. This distinction, however, is not
insignificant. Access to discovery may well prove sufficient to prevent
the validation of "scarecrow" patents, as the challenger will press to
litigate a patent whose invalidity is easily proven. At the same time,
the availability of discovery will secure protection for valid claims. It
ensures that some consent decrees will be submitted after a preview of
the merits, and not simply out of the expediency of avoiding further
litigation. Practical considerations also are likely to inhibit attempts to
reopen consent decrees validating .patents whose claims were defini-
tively corroborated by the discovery process in the prior suit. Thus,
the parties' access to judicial machinery can narrow the range of pat-
ents whose validity the parties seek subsequently to relitigate.
Nevertheless, the courts' sanction of the settlement submitted by
the parties does not ensure that consent decrees will protect only valid
patents from further challenge. Therefore, the consent decree, like
the license agreement, fails to accomplish an authoritative test of pat-
ent validity. An increased accuracy, therefore, cannot justify honoring
recitals of validity in consent decrees while abrogating the estoppel
created by license agreements.
2. Persons concluded: numbers and equities
A second possible basis -for distinguishing between the barrier of
licensee estoppel abrogated by Lear and the barrier erected by the
'consent decree lies in the number and equities of the parties thereaf-
ter precluded from challenging the validity of the patent. From a
numerical perspective, the doctrine of licensee estoppel closes the doors
of the court to a large group, perhaps comprising all those with suffi-
cient interest in a patent to challenge its validity;" all the assignors,"
USM Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel, 184 U.S.P.Q. 476, 477 (N.D. III. 1974),
affd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1975) (The court noted that the consent
decree was merely a matter of Formalizing a license agreement."); NCR Golf Ball Co. v.
Chemold Corp., 361 F. Supp. 187, 188 (ED.N.Y. 1973) (mem.) (The court filed a
memorandum opinion "to record [its] view that the judgment merely gives effect to the
agreement of the parties and is not based on any judicial examination of the validity or
scope of the patent."); Sealol Corp. v. Flexibox, Ltd., 242 F. Stipp. 693, 697-98 (D.D.C.
1965) (The court noted that "tilt is clear from the judgment that nothing was actually
adjudicated" and that the court entering the consent decree "was performing an essen-
tially administrative function in recording an agreement reached between the parties.")
Cf Wilson v. Haber Bros., 275 F. 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1921).
46
 Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976). See Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
•7
 Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342,
348-51 (1924).
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licensees" and their privies. 4 " Giving res judicata effect to consent de-
crees, however, bars only the parties and their privies from further
challenge. 50 Other licensees and interested third persons" are not
bound by the consent decree. 52 As for the respective equities of the
parties barred from challenging patent validity, they are not so com-
pletely different as might appear from the superficial comparison of
the position of the licensee with that of a party who, having signed a
consent decree and foregone an opportunity to go to trial on the
merits, is now attempting to relitigate the issue of patent validity.
Several factors might suggest, at the outset, that the licensee has
cleaner hands—and therefore stronger equities—than the party to the
consent decree who is seeking to relitigate the issue of validity. First,
the licensee may never have conceded the validity of the patent,"
whereas the party to the consent decree who seeks to avoid the doc-
trine of res judicata has conceded the patent's validity—after full op-
portunity for trial on the merits—and then cavalierly has ignored the
48 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836
(1950).
" Buckingham Prods. Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 192, 194-95 (6th Cir.
1939); Frick Co. v. Lindsay, 27 F.2d 59, 61 (4th Cir. 1928).
33
 Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S.Ct. 1509 (1976).
51
 Interested third persons would include all manufacturers of products which
are not licensed by the patentee and which might be deemed to infringe the patent.
33 See, e.g., Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (fith Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976); Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 677-78 (10th Cir.
1971).
The consent decree may affect third patties because the patent owner can offer
the consent judgment as evidence of validity in actions against different defendants.
Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Warren Knittittg Mills, Inc., 202 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir.
1953); PCR Golf Ball Co. v. Chemold Corp., 361 F. Supp. 187, 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
Nevertheless, the consent judgment would never have the same preclusive effect as
licensee estoppel except where the party to the consent decree was an exclusive licensee.
A consent decree precluding an exclusive licensee from further legal challenge is not
unduly troublesome. It could be argued, for example, that an exclusive license does not
create much of a clog on the free market of ideas. See To Bind or Not to Bind, note 34
supra, at 1349. Furthermore, a manufacturer able to negotiate an exclusive license
seems likely also to have sufficient resources to go to trial on the merits. Thus, any con-
sent judgment he negotiates is more likely to reflect the legal merits of his case, and not
financial limitations which might handicap his ability to proceed to trial. The recital of
validity in a consent decree negotiated by an exclusive licensee, therefbre, may well pro-
tect only valid patents from further challenge.
33 A patent licensing agreement may include a covenant not to contest patent va-
lidity. See, e.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gorr-m.111y, 144 U.S. 224, 232 (1892); National Clay
Prods. Co. v. Heath Unit Tile Co., 40 F.2d 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1930). But, because be-
fore the Supreme Court's decision in Lear the doctrine of licensee estoppel itself was
sufficient to obstruct the licensee's challenge to the validity of the patent, a concession
of validity in a license agreement was, in effect, gratuitous. In Lear, for example, Lear
never conceded the validity of Adkins' patent but challenged its patentability from the
time it acquired its licensing rights prior to the grant of the patent. 395 U.S. at 659-60.
Much of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lear was directed at the more typical licensee
who may negotiate a licensing agreement expressly to avoid "the necessity of defending
an expensive infringement suit during the period when he may be least able to afford
one." See id. at 669.
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consequences." Second, in consenting to the entry of a consent de-
cree, the signing party may have foregone alternative non-prejudicial
means of terminating the litigation." In fact, he might have
negotiated a license and thus avoided litigation altogether."
There are, however, indications that the licensee does not, in
fact, have stronger equities than the party to a consent decree because
the suggestion that the signing party has foregone non-prejudicial
means of terminating the litigation may be deceptive. That the earlier
suit concluded with a consent decree as opposed to a voluntary dis-
missal or a settlement should not have any bearing on the equities of
the patent-challenger who, in signing a consent decree, may have
simply acceded to the litigation strategy of the patent-owner. The
patent-owner, for example, can vitiate the challenger's ability to ter-
minate the litigation without prejudice. In a declaratory judgment ac-
tion, the owner can prevent the plaintiff from dismissing the action
over his objection by filing a counterclaim for infringement. 57 In an
infringement action, he can simply refuse to negotiate a settlement
agreement unless it is submitted to the court for entry as a consent
judgment. 58 Thus, the fact that the challenger seems to have foregone
alternative, non-prejudicial means of terminating the litigation may
54 Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 394 F. Stipp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). affd. 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976); Business Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Car-
son, 452 F.2d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1971).
55 As the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, he might have sought a vol-
untary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). See Wallace
Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 532
F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976). The plaintiff's ability voluntarily to dismiss an action is limited,
under Rule 41(a), to the period before the defendant has answered or moved for sum-
mary judgment. Also, some cases suggest that the plaintiffs right to a nonsuit termi-
nates once the parties have joined issue on the merits. See, e.g., Harvey Aluminum, Inc.
v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964
(1953). After that period, plaintiff may only dismiss with the consent of the court or on
stipulation of the other parties. See note 59 infra.
As the defendant charged with infringement, he might have negotiated a settle-
ment without calling upon the court to enter it as a binding judicial decree. See
Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co., 444 F.2d 425 (9th
Cir. 1971).
" The patentee, however, is under no obligation to offer to negotiate a license
before filing an action for infringement. Bela Seating Co. v. Puloron Prods., Inc., 438
F.2d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 1971). But see Allied Research Prods„ Inc. v. Heatbath Corp.,
300 F. Supp, 656, 657 (ND, Ill. 1969),
si Rule 41(a)(2) provides that after the defendant has filed an answer or a motion
for summary judgment, "an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save
upon the order of the court.... If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to the service upon hint of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court." FED. R. Cm P. 41(a)(2). See United States
Indus, Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 52 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
55
 The patent-owner's status as favored litigant under the Patent Statute may
make him particularly unwilling to accede to non-prejudicial settlements proposed by
the challenger. See text at notes 107-123 infra.
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simply reflect the patentee's superior resources and willingness to liti-
gate, rather than the respective equities of the parties.
Furthermore, the suggestion that the party to the consent decree
has abandoned the contest after full opportunity for trial on the
merits59 is misleading. The expense of litigating an infringement
suit" can render this "full opporttinity" self-defeating for the small
businessman. The consent decree may well constitute the one realistic
alternative for an alleged infringer sued by a patentee who refuses to
negotiate a pre-litigation licensing agreement or to accede to a non-
prejudicial means of terminating the litigation. til The patent-chal-
lenger's equities, therefore, should not diminish on signing a consent
decree because the submission of that agreement for entry by the
court may simply reflect the extent to which his options have been lim-
ited by his more powerful opponent.
Where the consent decree, however, was entered at the conclu-
sion of a declatory judgment suit brought by the challenger, the ques-
tion of his relative equities is somewhat more problematic. By seeking
a declaration of patent invalidity, the challenger took the offensive,
and thus rendered himself more vulnerable to the argument that he
either should have gone through with litigation on the merits or have
abandoned all objections. This approach, however, ignores the possi-
bility that the declaratory judgment•action brought by a manufacturer
threatened with an impending infringement suit may have rep-
resented more of a defensive than an offensive maneuver." On the
other hand, where the earlier suit which resulted in the consent
judgment was initiated during the term of a licensing agreement, the•
licensee then truly may be said to have been the aggressor. By signing
the license and conforming to its provisions, the licensee effectively
had immunized itself from the necessity of defending an expensive
infringement suit. Thus, the equities of the parties would justify the
application of res judicata where the licensee, for the second time dur-
ing the term of a license, has sought a declaratory judgment of the
patent's invalidity." Practical considerations, however, render this par-
59 Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd, 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976).
"" See text at notes 81-82 infra.
"See note 56 supra.
62 In effect, the requirement that an .`actual controversy" exist as prerequisite to
a declaratory judgment action suggests than an infringement suit must always be
threatened. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) provides that "(lin a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ...." See text at
note 125 infra. Thus, the initiation of a declaratory judgment action may be a defensive
maneuver in the sense that the alleged infringer, knowing that the patentee is about to
file an infringement suit, is thereby seeking simply to avail himself of the opportunity
to choose the time and place of suit. See note 130 infra.
" 3 The argument to apply res judicata also seems compelling because the licensor
has no alternatives in that situation. if the patent-owner is the defendant in a declara-
tory judgment action initiated prior to the negotiation of a license, he always has the
sanction of refusing thereafter to grant a lkense to that particular manufacturer.„Once
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titular combination of events rather unlikely." The prospect, there-
fore, of a licensee bringing two separate declaratory judgment actions
against the patentee during the term of the license should not other-
wise negate the equities of the patent-challenger.
Although the challenger's equities would not seem to change
once he has signed a consent judgment, the patentee's equities are ar-
guably more insistent upon taking such action. As the Supreme Court
noted in Lear, the equities of the patentee who has merely negotiated
a license agreement "are far from compelling [since his] patent
simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office [,]
... predicated on factors as to which reasonable men can differ
widely [and] ... buttressed by the presumption of validity
After a consent judgment, however, the patentee's claims draw sup-
port from a court's adjudication. In addition, where the consent de-
cree recites both validity and infringement, the patentee has won
greater concessions and received more substantial consideration than
the licensor who simply negotiates a no-contest clause in a licensing
agreement." Refusal to enforce the decree seems, therefore, more
destructive of his equities."
Thus, a comparison of the barrier of licensee estoppel with the
res judicata effect of the consent decree, both in terms of the num-
bers and the equities of the parties thereafter precluded from chal-
lenging the validity of the patent, is somewhat inconclusive. On one
hand, the numerical perspective might justify honoring recitals of va-
the license has been negotiated, however, he may not be able to terminate it even
though his licensee insists on bringing a declaratory judgment action, because the licen-
see can protect his rights under the agreement by continuing to pay royalties.
Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. v. International Salt Co., 183 U.S.P.Q. 748, 750 (N.D.N.Y.
1974).
64 The first action, even where terminated by consent, may last long enough to
diminish the marginal utility of a second suit. It may make more sense for the licensee
to pay out the royalty agreement for the remaining term of the license than to become
liable for litigation costs. This is not necessarily the case where the first action preceded
the license agreement, so that the second action a fortiori occurs earlier during the term
of the licensing agreement when the remaining royalty liability is likely to be more sub-
stantial.
Significantly, none of the post-Lear cases involving an attempt to relitigate issues
adjudicated in a consent decree entered in an earlier declaratory judgment action du-
plicated this hypothetical situation. Instead, in each case, the plaintiff brought his initial
declaratory judgment action before signing a license, during a time when he was still
vulnerable to an infringement action. See, e.g., Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus.,
Inc„ 532 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1976); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474
F.2d 1391, 1392 (2d Cir. 1973).
65 395 U.S. at 670.
"Cf. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974,
976 (7th Cir. 1973) (settlement agreement provided , that defendant in infringement ac-
tion would pay the patentee $70,000 for past infringement).
64 Doubts about the effectiveness of judicial oversight will undercut this argu-
ment. See text at notes 33-45 supra. If, as this comment concludes, there is no guaran-
tee that judicial participation will ensure that only valid patents will be protected by a
consent decree, then the support which the patentee's claims draw from the court's ad-
judication is more ceremonious than substantive.
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lidity in consent decrees while abrogating the same concessions in
license agreements because consent decrees may affect fewer parties
and are, therefore, less obstructive of the public interest in an au-
thoritative testing of a patent's validity. On the other hand, the equi-
table perspective would not require different treatment of the barrier
of licensee estoppel and that erected by the consent decree because
the equities of the patent-challenger do not necessarily diminish, nor
do those of the patentee substantially increase, once they have submit-
ted a consent agreement to the court.
3. Timing of the challenge to patent validity
If disregarding recitals of validity in consent decrees substantially
were to delay the legal challenge to patent validity, the impact on the
timing of the legal challenge might constitute a third possible justifica-
tion for continuing to honor such recitals in consent judgments while
disregarding those in licensing agreements. The timing of such legal
challenge is critical because long delays may work to eliminate al-
together the prospect of an ultimate authoritative testing of patent
validity.°° Because patents expire after a 17-year term," at some point
it must become more advantageous for a licensee to pay out the re-
maining terms of a royalty agreement than to incur the costs of bring-
ing suit. This deterrent effect is particularly severe in the many scien-
tific fields in which technological development proceeds sufficiently
rapidly as to make a patent obsolete long before its term has
expired. 7° Furthermore, the question of timing implicates the public
interest not only because long delay may jeopardize the ultimate au-
thoritative testing of patent validity, but also because the burden of
any delay is borne by the consumer as the licensee passes on the cost
of royalties in the form of higher prices which are unrecoverable,
even in the event of an ultimate holding of invalidity."
Some delay, however, may be inevitable, even in the context of
the abrogation of the doctrine of licensee estoppel. In Lear, for exam-
ple, the Court recognized that the manufacturer who enters a licens-
ing agreement after the patent has been issued may do so, at least in
part, precisely to avoid the necessity of defending an expensive in-
fringement action during the period when he may be least able to al-
G/ Lear, 395 U.S. at 673-74.
11 " 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
TOG/. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673-74,
71
 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 346 (1971). The magnitude of the problem is obvious in light of the average
annual gain of a patent—estimated at about $70,000. Rollins, In rem Intialidity,. A Solu-
tion in Search of a Problem?, 52 j. PAT. Orr. SOUS' 561, 562 (1970). The problem is
further compounded by the slowness of the judicial process. For patents which become
involved in litigation, the average period from issuance by the Patent Office to the first
decision of an appellate court is 10 years 7.5 months. AN ANALYSIS OE PATENT
LITIGATION STATisTics, note 33 supra, at 5.
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ford one." 72 The alleged infringer who, before the Supreme Court's
decision in Lear, might have brought a declaratory judgment action to
challenge a patent's validity before signing a license agreement, now
may negotiate the license and delay his suit until he has had a better
chance to assess the extent of his own resources and the strength of
the patentee's claims or is threatened by other manufacturers who
were not paying royalties. In overturning the doctrine of licensee
estoppel" and thereby preserving this subsequent opportunity for the
licensee to challenge the patent's validity, the Court implied that the
initial delay in bringing the legal challenge was not unacceptable if it
facilitated an eventual authoritative adjudication. If, however, the will-
ingness to reopen issues concluded by a consent decree substantially
increased that delay, this impact on the timing of a legal challenge
might serve to justify continuing to honor recitals of validity in con-
sent decrees while abrogating the estoppel created by licensing
agreements.
The Sixth Circuit has suggested that the willingness to reopen is-
sues concluded by a consent decree would cause an unacceptable
delay in the challenge to patent validity:
When a consent decree is to be given res judicata effect,
litigants are encouraged to litigate the issue of validity
rather than to foreclose themselves by a consent decree
.... By giving res judicata effect to consent decrees this
court protects the public interest in that an alleged in-
fringer is deprived of a judicial device which could be used
to postpone and delay a final adjudication of validity."
It is not certain, however, that giving res judicata effect to consent de-
crees necessarily would accelerate the legal testing of patent validity.
Clearly. once in court, the challenger will be more likely to go to trial
on the merits rather than to foreclose himself with a consent decree."
However, a marginal manufacturer who knows that he cannot afford
to go to trial will become more intent on avoiding litigation altogether,
preferring to negotiate a license," thus actually delaying an authorita-
tive testing of patent validity. Therefore, it would seem that the refusal
to grant res judicata effect to consent decrees in fact might encourage
earlier challenges to the patentee's claims. Assured of a second chance,
the purported infringer might be less cautious in assessing his own
readiness to bring suit. In conclusion, then, it is clear that the abroga-
tion of the doctrine of licensee estoppel may, in some circumstances,
delay the ultimate adjudication of patent validity. The willingness to
disregard recitals of validity in consent decrees does not substantially
72 395 U.S. at 669.
"Id. at 670-71.
" Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976).
73 Id.
7 ° See Lear, 395 U.S. at 669.
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increase that delay except in the case of the patent-challenger who is
already involved in litigation. Thus, the different treatment of the
barrier raised by the consent decree and that formerly created by the
license cannot seemingly be justified in terms of a different impact on
the timing of a legal challenge to patent validity.
4. The policies of licensee estoppel compared with those of res ju-
d icata
The estoppel created by the license agreement grew out of the
"technical requirements of contract doctrine,"" which forbid a
"purchaser to repudiate his promises simply because he later becomes
dissatisfied with the bargain he has made."'" However, as the Court in
Lear noted, even these considerations are not particulary insistent:
"[A]lthough licensee estoppel may be consistent with the letter of con-
tractual doctrine, we cannot say that it is compelled by the spirit of
contract law, which seeks to balance the claims of promisor and prom-
isee in accord with the requirements of good faith."'"
The refusal to accord res judicata effect to consent judgments
implicates not simply the technical requirements of contract doctrine,
but also policies of judicial economy and the notion of judicial dignity.
Implication of the concept of judicial dignity reflects the judiciary's
general concern that the practice of reopening issues already adjudi-
cated by the consent decree "would be subversive, if not indeed
wholly destructive, of the plenary power of the court to enforce its
decrees."8 ° The promotion of judicial economy, on the other hand,
seems particularly crucial in patent litigation, for the lengthy, expen-
sive character of patent litigation intensifies the importance of the
conservation of judicial and individual resources normally sought in
any application of res judicata. The cost of litigating patent validity
has been variously estimated to run from $50,000 8 ' on upward to be-
tween $80,000 and $110,000. 82 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, patent cases take an "inordinate amount of trial
time."83 The fact that many patent suits never go to trial on the
"Id. at 670.
"Id. at 668.
7" Id. al 670.
"" Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 780 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976), quoting Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co- 71 F.2d 850, 851-52 (6th Cir. 1934); accord, Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson
Indus., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 393, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), all d, 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir, 1976).
"Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 1691, S. 2164, S. 2597 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt.2, at 616 (1968) (statement of Henry J. Cappello, President, Space Recovery
Research Center, Inc., and consultant on patent policy for the National Small Business
Association).
82 Harris, Cost of EnfOrcement of industrial Property Bights, 13 1nEA, Conference
Number 1969, at 53 (1969).
83 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 337 (1971). While patent cases constitute less than 2% of the total number of
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merits"' has not lightened the burden imposed by patent litigation on
either the judicial system or the individual litigants. Sometimes the
parties submit settlement agreements only after several years of vari-
ous pleadings, briefs, discovery, and pre-trial conferences." Because
discovery is the largest single component of patent litigation cost,"
often most of the expense has been incurred by the time the parties
arrive at a settlement agreement.
The application of res judicata principles to consent decrees,
then, would prevent not only relitigation, but also the unnecessary
duplication of legal costs. In addition, it would conserve resources in
the initial suit, for granting finality to consent decrees encourages set-
tlement. By contrast, the failure to give consent decrees conclusive ef-
fect "would force every patent validity and infringement suit to a trial
on the merits to assure a res judicata effect. It would discourage set-
tlement of such litigation, since otherwise there could be no assurance
of finality."87
Res judicata, however, is not a wholly inflexible doctrine and
may yield to considerations which are more insistent than the concern
for judicial economy." Thus, important qualifications to the princi-
ples of res judicata have developed in the patent area to protect "the
substantial public interest in fruitful utilization of the grant."" In
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.," for example, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the failure to interpose a patent misuse de-
fense in earlier infringement litigation would not foreclose an anti-
trust claim based on patent misuse."' The Court determined that the
outcome should not be governed by "usual rules governing the set-
tlement of private litigation" because the application of res judicata
civil suits filed each year in the district courts, id. at 336, 22% of all civil trials termi-
nated in 1970 which required 20 or more days of trial were patent cases. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1970, Table C-9 (Temp. ed. 1971), cited in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
338 n.33 (1971).
" Upwards of 72% of all patent cases terminated in the federal courts between
1949 and 1958 were concluded by consent or consent dismissal. STAFF OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF TILE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86 CH CONG., 2D SESS., As ANALYSIS OF PATENT LI'I'ICA'rION STATis-rics 13
(Comm. Print 1961).
83 See, e.g., cases cited at note 33 supra .
°° Harris, Chuppe & Tri, An Empirical Study of Cost Factors in Patent Litigation, 15
IDEA 523, 526 (Winter 1971-72).
" Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Industries, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976).
" J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE.10.405 [ I 1], at 783-87, II 0.409[5], at 1032 (2d ed.
1974).
" 9
 Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. ION. 818, 882 (1952).
" 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
"Id, at 669-70. Cf. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 177
(1942).
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would prejudice the public interest in confining a patent to its legiti-
mate scope." 2
Even in the absence of antitrust claims, the public interest in the
elimination of invalid patents may require a qualification to the prin-
ciples of res judicata. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation" 3 the Supreme Court recognized the relative insig-
nificance of the concern for judicial economy in the context of federal
patent policy. Overruling Triplett v. Lowell," which "exemplified the
. doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, ordaining that unless both par-
ties ... in a second action are bound by a judgment in a previous
case, neither party ... in the second action may use the prior judg-
ment as determinative of an issue in the second action,"" 5 the Court
held that a defendant is not precluded from raising a plea of estoppel
when charged with infringement of a patent held invalid in an in-
fringement suit brought against a different defendant." In reaching
its conclusion, the Court explicitly noted that the reduction of litiga-
tion attendant on the repudiation of the mutuality doctrine was an
"incidental" concern."' Instead, the determinative factor was the
Court's desire to counter Triplett's tendency to multiply the oppor-
tunities for patentees to exact royalties for the use of an idea that is
not in fact patentable."
In addition, there are practical considerations which may tip the
balance so that the public interest in the elimination of invalid patents
clearly outweighs the benefits of res judicata. The expense"" and
complexity of patent litigation,'" as well as the handicaps imposed by
the Patent Code on prospective patent challengers,'" will inhibit
casual efforts to relitigate issues adjudicated in earlier consent decrees.
As a result, litigants are not likely to initiate additional suits against
patents whose validity was clearly corroborated in earlier litigation
which terminated in a consent decree. Instead, these practical con-
cerns suggest that attempts to reopen a consent judgment's recital of
patent validity will likely be confined to those situations where the
consent judgment simply reflects the parties' relative capacities to go
to trial rather than the relative merits of their legal claims. In these
situations, the public interest in securing authoritative determinations
of patent validity would seem clearly to outweigh the principles of fi-
nality.
In conclusion, then, a comparison of the policies behind the two
barriers to further challenges to patent validity indicates that the judi-
92 320 U.S. at 670.
93 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
94 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
95
 402 U.S. at 320-21.
96 Id. at 350.
9? Id. at 349.
"See id. at 342-43, 345-49.
9 ' See text at notes 81-82 supra.
'°° See text at note 4] supra.
'°' See text at notes 107-117 infra.
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cial policies of res judicata are prima facie more compelling than the
contractual principles of licensee estoppel. This fact, however, does
not justify honoring the barrier posed by consent decrees while disre-
garding that raised by licensing agreements, because the policies of
res judicata are themselves flexible and must be balanced against
competing considerations. Allowing relitigation will not unduly
jeopardize the promotion of judicial economy, since practical concerns
will severely restrict the number of attempts to reopen consent de-
crees. The public interest in the elimination of invalid patents, there-
fore, must outweigh the importance of the finality principle.
B. Danger in the Fact of Different Treatment: Over-Zealous Litigation
A comparison of consent decrees with the doctrine of licensee
estoppel not only fails to isolate any compelling justification for hon-
oring the barrier raised by the consent decree while abrogating the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, but also reveals•a potential for overzeal-
ous litigation which may be created by the very fact of different
treatment. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lear, the patentee
could deflect future challenges to the validity of his claims simply by
negotiating licensing agreements with interested manufacturers. 102
After Lear, litigation may become more attractive, because a consent
judgment can secure the benefit of finality lost when Lear abrogated
the doctrine of licensee estoppel. 103
 Granting res judicata effect to
consent judgments,therefore, may well encourage overzealous litiga-
tion by the patentee in an attempt to undercut Lear.
The potential for overzealous litigation which might arise as a
result of giving res judicata effect to consent judgments has been rec-
ognized by a court confronting the analogous question of the conclu-
sive effect of settlement agreements. In Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign
Co. v. Golden State Advertising Co.,'" the Ninth Circuit refused to dis-
tinguish a settlement agreement from the Lear license situation."s
Holding the no-contest clause in a settlement agreement to be unen-
forceable, the court noted that it was "just as easy to couch licensing
arrangements in the form of settlement agreements." 1 °6 The court
thereby effectively implied the enforcement of the no-contest clause
would encourage the patent owner to precipitate litigation solely to
induce a settlement agreement.
10! Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836
(1950). Bui see Lear, 395 U.S. at 664-67, for a history of the proliferation of exceptions
undercutting the doctrine of licensee estoppel.
103 Consent decrees adjudicating both validity and infringement generally are
deemed conclusive. See cases cited at note 147 infra. The post-Lear cases, however, have
uniformly refused to give full res judicata effect to consent judgments reciting solely
validity, as opposed to validity and infringement. See cases cited at note 147 infra.
1 " 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1971).
'" Id. at 427.
'" Id.
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While the prospect of overzealous litigation does not necessarily
presuppose bad faith on the part of the patentee, it does reflect the
realities of patent litigation. The patentee holds the advantage inside
and possibly outside the courtroom."' The costs of patent litigation,
which is normally enormously complex, lengthy and expensive, 1 °"
handicap the prospective challenger more severely than they burden
the patentee. First, the patent-challenger initially incurs heavier costs
in combatting the statutory presumption of patent validity'°9 which
ensures that patent-owners will be the "heavily favoured class of
litigants""° under the patent statute. Thus, the statute forces the chal-
lenger both to produce proof to counter the presumption and to at-
tempt to rebut the patentee's efforts to bolster his claims, whereas it
allows the patent-owner to choose merely to rely on his opponent's in-
ability to combat the presumption of validity.'"
A second factor which contributes to the patentee's advantage
inside the courtroom is the courts' interpretation of the patent
statute's provisions for the distribution of costs at the conclusion of
litigation. Section 284 of the Patent Code authorizes the court to
award the patentee damages sufficient to compensate for the
infringement, as well as interest and costs. 1 ' The court may award
punitive damages for infringement up to three times the amount
found or assessed."a To compensate for the notorious cost of patent
litigation, courts are usually generous in their awards to the
patentee." 4 If the challenger is successful, however, he must be satis-
fied with a dismissal of the action and a limited bill of costs. 1 ' Be-
cause of the courts' narrow interpretation of "exceptional cases"'
warranting an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party, the successful defendant in an infringement action generally
"'The typical infringement case dues nut pit the lonely inventor against the in-
fringing corporation. Corporations are often the patentee, receiving more than hall or
the patents issued. From 1939 to 1955, the 176 largest U.S. corporations received about
20% of all patents issued. AN ANALvsts or PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS, 511Pra note 84
at 9.
'°" See text at notes 81-82 supra.
"" Section 282 of the Patent Code provides that "la) patent shall be presumed
valid.... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent ... shall rest on the party as-
serting it." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970). The presumption, however, may be weakened by
the Patent Office's failure to consider all the pertinent art. Tee-Pak, inc. v. St. Regis
Paper Co. 491 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974).
1 " Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 335.
"I Id.
112 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1970).
in id,
Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative
Law, 55 NARY, L. REV. 950, 969 (1942).
15 Id. at 970. The Federal Rules authorize allowance of costs "as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). A list of litiga-
tion expenses which may be taxed as costs by a federal court are set out in 28 U.S.C. §
1920 (1970).
"" 35 U.S.C, § 285 (1970), provides that "litihe court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."
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can recover his legal costs only by showing bad faith on the part of
the patentee.'" Thus, the patent-challenger initially must expend
considerably more than the patentee to make out a prima facie case
and, in addition, stands less of a chance to recoup his expenses in the
event that he succeeds on the merits.
Furthermore, the patentee can parlay his favored status to
further advantage by shopping for a pro-patent forum. Usually the
agressor in patent litigation," 8
 the patentee is in good position to
capitalize on the disparity" 8
 between the attitudes of the circuits. The
purported infringer is unlikely to initiate litigation both because of his
disfavored status and because of pitfalls in the declaratory judrient
procedure. 12 ° As the aggressor, the patentee is also in a position to
pick weaker opponents until he has obtained a few judicial declara-
tions of validity.'" A favorable history of litigation increases his bar-
gaining power outside the courtroom in negotiating either license
agreements or consent judgments with opponents unwilling or unable
to go to trial on the merits.' 22
 These consent judgments then may be
offered as evidence of validity in subsequent actions against different,
more powerful defendants.' 23
The alleged infringer cannot necessarily offset his handicap
under the patent statute by initiating a declaratory judgment suit, for
there are substantial limitations on the manufacturer's ability to sue
for a declaration of patent invalidity. Due to the Act's "actual con-
troversy" requirement,'" the patentee may be allowed to avoid the
declaratory judgment simply by refraining from charging
infringement.'" Furthermore, the court may dismiss a declaratory
" 7
 Alburger v. Magnaflux Corp., 444 F.2d 1406, 1407 (9th Cir. 1971); Jacquard
Knitting Mach. Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., 213 F.2d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 1954).
"2 See Rollins, In rem Invalidity: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 52 J. PAT. OH.
SOC'Y 561, 567 (1970).
12
 In the period from 1966 to 1971, the range varied from the high of 47.8%
(10/21) patents validated in the Sixth Circuit, to the low of 0% (0/18) validated in the
Eighth Circuit. The figures for the other circuits were as follows: 1st: 33.3% (3/9); 2d:
25.0% (7/28); 3d: 26.4% (5/19); 4th: 13.6% (3/22); 5th: 45.9% (16/35); 7th: 46.1%
(35/76); 9th: 15.0% (8/53); 10th: 14.3% (117); D.C.: 16.7% (1/6). Brief for Appellant at
35, Appendix B, Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1976). Appellant's Brief reproduces and updates a table set out in KArFON, THE CRISIS
OF LAW IN PATENTS (Patent Resources Group 1970).
12° In order to establish that an actual "case or controversy" exists, the "infringer"
may produce evidence proving his infringement, thereby provoking to his detriment a
counterclaim not otherwise contemplated by the patentee. Rollins, In rem Invalidity: A
Solution in Search of a Problem?, J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 561, 567 (1970).
121 Id. at 564.
' 22 /d.
"3
 Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Warren Knitting Mills, Inc„ 202 F.2d 395, 397
(3d Cir. 1953); PCR Golf Ball Co. v. Chemold Corp., 361 F. Supp. 187, 188 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
144
 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970) provides that "Ii]n a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration ,..."
"3
 Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc. v. Deknatal, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 726-28 (8th
Cir. 1975); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 319 F. Supp. 307, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
86
RES JODICATA EFFECT OF CONSENT DECREES
judgment action when an infringement suit involving the same parties
is pending,'" or perhaps even where one has been subsequently
filed."' Once the declaratory judgment plaintiff has hurdled the pos-
sibility of dismissal for lack of standing, the patent owner may coun-
terclaim for infringement, thereby becoming eligible for an award for
treble damages under the Patent Code,'" whereas the manufacturer
may not be able to recover his legal costs even if he succeeds on the
merits.'" In effect, therefore, the availability of a declaratory judg-
ment action fails to offset the challenger's handicap under the Patent
Statute. In filing such action, he gains only the opportunity to choose
the time and place of suit.' 3 °
In conclusion, it would seem that honoring consent decrees
while abrogating the doctrine of licensee estoppel will likely create a
dangerous potential for overzealous litigation by patentees seeking to
protect their patents from future legal challenge. Since the negotia-
tion of licensing agreements no longer affords immunity from suits
brought by the licensee, the patent-owner may well choose to exploit
his status as favored litigant under the Patent Code and resort to liti-
gation in order to secure the same protection through the negotiation
of consent judgments.
C. Conclusion
A comparison of consent decrees and the doctrine of licensee es-
toppel in the context of federal patent policy fails to isolate any com-
pelling justification for continuing to honor the barrier raised by the
consent decree to further challenges to patent validity while abrogat-
ing the doctrine of licensee estoppel. The court's imprimatur on the
decree submitted by the parties does not ensure that consent judg-
ments, any more than licenses, will not obstruct the public interest in
1970); E. BORCHARD, DECI.ARATORY jUDGMENTS, at 807 (2d ed. 1941); accord, Treennend
Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 1941). But see E.J. Brooks Co. v. Stof-
fel Seals Corp., 160 F. Supp. 581, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1 " TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1974).
1 " See Columbia Boiler Co. v. Manville Boiler Co., 188 F. Supp. 520, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). The fact that plaintiff had begun its suit for a declaratory judgment
five years prior to defendant's suit for infringement, was a factor, but "by no means de-
terminative" of whether the declaratory judgment action should be stayed pending the
outcome of the infringement suit. Id.
1311 35 U.S.C. 284 (1970).
12° See Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Moraine Prods., 509 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1974).
But see Security Ins. Co. v. White, 236 F.2d 215, 220 (10th Cir. 1956).
13" Venue of a declaratory judgment action is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(1970). See Minnesota Automotive, Inc. v. Stromberg Hydraulic Brake & Coupling Co.,
309 F. Su pp. 614, 616 (D. Minn. 1970). The other central advantage provided by the
Declaratory Judgments Act is that the defendant in an infringement suit can file a
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity, thereby precluding a dismissal
without prejudice and thus preventing the patent-owner from making "irresponsible
threats and getting all the benefits of stifling competition without submitting to a show-
down." E. BoRtainan, DEcrARATota JUDGMENTS, at 804 (2d ed. 1941).
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the elimination of invalid patents, although the litigants' access to dis-
covery procedures, as a practical matter, may serve to eliminate
further controversy over patents shown to be either clearly valid or
clearly spurious. Furthermore, while the consent decree forecloses
fewer parties from future challenges to a patent's validity, the equities
of the parties concluded in each case are not significantly different.
Although the judicial policies which support res judicata are more
compelling than the contractual doctrine overridden by Lear, these
judicial policies are themselves flexible and must be balanced against
the public interest in the free circulation of ideas. This public interest
seems paramount in light of the practical features of patent litigation
which will serve to inhibit casual attempts to relitigate the validity of
patents whose claims already have been corroborated by a consent
judgment. In addition, the comparison of consent decrees and licen-
see estoppel suggests that the very fact of different treatment creates
ominous incentives for overzealous litigation, as patent-owners resort
to litigation in order to secure favorable consent judgments which will
protect their grant from future legal challenge by the same defen-
dant.
In the absence of any compelling justification for continuing to
honor the barrier raised by the consent decree while overturning the
doctrine of licensee estoppel, it is submitted that such different treat-
ment is inconsistent with the rationale of Lear which seeks to promote
authoritative adjudications of the validity of the patentee's claims.
Nevertheless, because any erosion of the principles of res
judicata will threaten the sanctity of a court's prior action, it seems un-
likely that the judiciary will look favorably on the argument to allow
litigants to reopen issues adjudicated by a consent decree entered in
patent litigation. Therefore, this comment will next explore the possi-
bility of an alternative solution—giving res judicata effect only to
those consent decrees adjudicating both validity and infringe-
ment—which may serve to retain the benefits of res judicata, while
minimizing the disadvantages inherent in an application of the finality
principle to patent litigation.
II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSENT JUDGMENTS ADJUDICATING
VALIDITY AND THOSE ADJUDICATING BOTH VALIDITY AND
INFRINGEMENT
One judicial response to the problems incident to an application
of res judicata to consent judgments in patent litigation has been the
development of a distinction"' between consent decrees solely reciting
validity and those adjudicating both validity and infringement, In giv-
ing full res judicata effect only to those reciting both validity and in-
fringement, the courts have attempted to balance the competing pol-
icy considerations involved in patent litigation by giving conclusive ef-
"I See, e.g., cases cited at note 147 infra.
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fect only to those consent decrees in which the recital of validity is less
likely to obstruct the public interest in the invalidation of spurious
patents. This section will examine the development, possible bases and
viability of that distinction.
A. Development of the Distinction
In an action for patent infringement, the patent owner•can re-
cover damages only when he proves both that his patent is valid and
that the defendant had infringed it.'" The alleged infringer, on the
other hand, succeeds if he proves either that the patent is invalid or
that he has not infringed.' 33 Thus, a finding of validity, when coupled
with a finding of noninfringement, is a gratuitous holding, immaterial
to the disposition of the case.'"
The distinction between adjudications of validity and those in-
volving both validity and infringement first appeared in fully con-
tested cases. In Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co.,' 35 the trial
court has entered a decree in an infringement case sustaining the va-
lidity of one claim of the patent but dismissing the bill for failure to
prove infringment. 13" The Supreme Court held that the defendants
were entitled to have the recital of validity eliminated from the decree
because it was irrelevant to the holding.'" Subsequently, in Cover v.
Schwartz,"H the Second Circuit introduced a constitutional basis for
the distinction.'" In dismissing the patentee's appeal for want of
jurisdiction, the court noted that "once the issue of infringement is
decided against the patentee, there exists no case or controversy jus-
tifying a decision in his favor that the patent is valid."'" On the basis
of these two cases, the Supreme Court in Alvater v. Freeman"' noted
132 Cover V. Schwartz, 133 F,2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 LI,S.
749 (1943). Invalidity of the patent and noninfringement are defenses to any action for
infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (t970).
"3 Id. at 545.
134
 Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank,
concurring); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 267 F.
Supp. 726, 782 (S.D. Cal. 1966), modified on other grounds and affd, 407 F.2d 288 (9th
Cir. 1969); Sperti Prods., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 272 F. Supp. 441, 447-48 (D. Del.
1967), affd, 399 F,2d 607 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam); accord, Altvater v. Freeman, 319
U.S. 359, 363 (1943); cf: Zalkind v. Scheinman, 80 F. Supp. 299, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (Held: improper for a court to combine a finding that the plaintiff is not the
prior inventor with a finding of validity of his claims because that gratuitous holding of
validity would be against the public interest).
15 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
Thomas & Betts Co. v. Electrical Fittings Corp., 23 F. Stipp. 920, 921, 926
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 100 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1938), rend, 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
1" 307 U.S. at 242.
135
 133 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 749 (1943).
' 32 See id. at 545.
1 " Id.
14 ' 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
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that "[do hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a
hypothetical case. "142
In Addressograph Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper,'" the Second Circuit
applied this principle to consent decrees and . sought to restrict the
conclusive effect of "hypothetical" decisions.' 44 The court concluded
that a consent decree's recital of validity should not be given res
judicata effect without:
either an adjudication of infringement, or a grant of some
relief from which infringement may be inferred [because]
the public interest in a judical determination of the invalid-
ity of a worthless patent is great enough to warrant the
conclusion that a defendant is not estopped by a decree of
validity ... unless it is clear that in the litigation resulting in
the decree the issue of validity was genuine. 15
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lear which sought to facilitate
the private litigant's challenge to patent validity has not affected the
viability of the Addressograph rule, which precluded further challenge
where the decree recited both validity and infringement. Addressograph
was effectively reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in Broadview Chemical
Corp. v. Loctite Carp.'" Furthermore, the post-Lear cases generally
have restricted res judicata effect to consent decrees adjudicating both
validity and infringement, although the result has not always stemmed
142 Id. at 363.
143 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946).
144
 id. at 485.
145 id.
After Addressograph, the question of the propriety of adjudications of validity in
the absence of infringement continued to arise in fully contested cases where there was
some confusion in the decisions. Compare United States Plywood Corp. v. General
Plywood Corp., 370 F.2d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967);
Sparton Corp. v. Evans Prods. Co., 293,F.2d 699, 705 (fith Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 967 (1962) (holding that the court had properly found the patent in question valid
despite a finding of noninfringement), with Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.,
452 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1971); Drew Chem. Corp. v. Hercules Inc., 407 F.2d 360,
362-63 (2d Cir. 1969); Lockwood v. Langendorf United Bakeries, Inc., 324 F.2d 82,
91-92 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that a judgment should not pass on a patent's validity ab-
sent a finding that it had been infringed). There were, however, no cases involving the
res judicata treatment of consent decrees reciting solely validity. The distinction was
approved in Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.
1966), where the court accorded full res judicata effect to a consent decree which in-
cluded a permanent injunction from which the court inferred a finding of past
infringement. Id. at 321-22. In addition, those cases reciting both validity and infringe-
ment were given full res judicata effect. Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d
335, 338 (7th Cir. 1969); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 943 (1965); Hopp Press, Inc. v. Joseph Freeman & Co., 323 F.2d 636, 637 (2d
Cir. 1963); Kiwi Coders Corp. v. Acro Tool & Die Works, 250 F.2d 562, 568 (7th Cir.
1957).
143
 74 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (2d Cir. 1973). Accord, Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson
Indus., 532 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1976).
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from explicit recognition of the Addressograph distinction.'" Only in
USA/ Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steeli" has a court suggested the possi-
bility that the "policy of unfettered contesting of patents announced
in Lear" would require the judiciary to allow the parties to relitigate
validity even where the consent decree adjudicated both validity and
infringemene" because the consent decree "was merely a matter of
formalizing a license agreement." 15 °
14 ' The following cases have explicitly followed Addressograph in refusing to give
res judicata effect to consent decrees reciting solely validity: Kraly v. National Distillers
Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (7th Cir. 1974); Business Forms Finishing Serv.,
Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1971); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 364 F.
Supp. 547, 549-50 (N.D. HL 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir.
1974).
Other cases have denied res judicata effect to consent judgments reciting solely
validity, without explicitly following the Addressograph rule. Butterfield v. Oculus Con-
tact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. III. 1971), affd per curiam, 177 U.S.P.Q. 33
(7th Cir. 1973). CJI Rialto Prods., Inc. v. Rayex Corp., 166 U.S.P.Q. 222, 223 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1970).
Decrees reciting both validity and infringement, on the oilier hand, generally
have been deemed conclusive, Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 1".2d
846, 848 (2d Cir. 1976); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 1- 7 ,2(1 775, 781 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474
F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (2d Cir. 1973); Schnitger v. Canoga Electronics Corp„ 462 1 7 .2r1 628
(9th Cir. 1972) (per curium); United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Balm Corp., 430 F.2d
998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1970); cf. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spitler & Spitler, Inc.,
489 F.2d 974, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1973). But see Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir. 1974) (dictum); USM corp. v. Standard Pressed
Steel Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 476, 477 (N.D. Ill. 1974), alp on other grounds, 524 F.2d 1097,
1099 (7th Cir. 1975); of Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertis-
ing Co., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971).
Only two of these cases have explicitly followed Addressograph in according full
res judicata effect to consent judgments adjudicating infringement as well as validity.
Wallace Clark & . Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1976); Broad-
view Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (2d Cir. 1973). Most opin-
ions either have not recognized or have not decided the viability of the distinction:
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 779-80 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 1509 (1976) (apparently not recognizing the distinction in deciding not to follow the
7th Circuit's Crane and Kraly decisions where the consent decrees only recited validity);
Schnitger v. Canoga Electronics Corp., 462 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curians) (no
discussion of the distinction); Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Eclipse Fuel Engineering
Co., 471 F.2d 308, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973) (need not
decide whether the distinction justifies different treatment because the licensee waived
any rights he might otherwise have had through his action during the course of the
trial); cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 739-40 (9th Cir.
1971) (saving the quesiton whether a concession of a copyright's validity is res,judicata).
See also USM Corp. v. Standard Pressed Steel Co., 524 F.2d 1097, 1099 (7th Cir. 1975)
(finding it unnecessary to reach the question of the res judicata effect of a consent
judgment adjudicating validity and infringement or to decide the issue of the viability
of the Addressograph distinction).
' 4" 184 U.S.P.Q. 476 (N.D. III. 1974), affd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 1097 (7th
Cir. 1975).
"" Id. at 477. On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to
reach "Itlhe question ... whether a consent judgment adjudicating infringement as well
as validity bars a party to the judgment from subsequently challenging the validity of
the patent ...." 524 F.2d at 1098-99.
1 " 184 U.S.P.Q. at 477.
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B. Possible Bases of the Distinction
1. Constitutional basis for the distinction
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution invests the federal courts
with the power to decide "Cases" and "Controversies."'" No federal
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to issue opinions in cases where there
is no definite and concrete controversy touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse interests.' 52 Thus, in patent infringement cases,
courts have viewed the element of a past or threatened infringement
as an indispensable prerequisite to a judgment upholding the validity
of a patent,' 53 "[for, once the issue of infringement is decided against
the patentee, there exists no case or controversy justifying a decision
in his favor that the patent is valid."'" As a result, once a court has
found no infringement, it must dismiss for want of jurisdiction.' 55
Furthermore, if the court finding noninfringement then proceeds to
enter a judgment sustaining validity of the patent, the alleged in-
fringer is entitled to have the recital of validity eliminated from the
decree.'" There is, therefore, a firm constitutional basis for the dis-
tinction between fully litigated decrees of validity and adjudications of
both validity and infringement because without infringement, there is
no actual controversy which can serve as the predicate for the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts under Article
Two separate factors, however, suggest that the constitutional
dimension of this distinction drawn in fully litigated dispositions is not
relevant to the inquiry into the res judicata effect of a consent decree.
Therefore, these constitutional considerations cannot serve to justify
giving conclusive effect only to consent judgments of both validity and
infringement. First, consent judgments which adjudicate only validity
generally do not address themselves to the issue of infringement.'"
As a result, there is usually no express finding of noninfringement
151 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
1 " Cover, 133 F.2d at 544. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
"3 See, e.g., Cover, 133 F.2d at 544; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
319 F. Supp. 307, 308-09 (S.D.Isi.Y. 1970). There is, however, no requirement that a
court finding no infringement must refuse to decide that a patent is invalid. Cover, 133
F.2d at 545. "Indeed, since the public is affected, there is much to be said for a decision
in such a case as to the invalidity of the alleged patent monopoly ... whenever the issue
of invalidity is before the court and the evidence warrants such a decision." id.
(footnote omitted). This distinction stems from the fact that the patentee must prove
both validity and infringement in order to prevail, whereas the alleged infringer suc-
ceeds on the merits if he can establish either invalidity or noninfringement. Id.
L" Cover, 133 F.2d at 545, See Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co.,
307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939). Accord, Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp„ 130 F.2d 290, 293
(2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring) ("For to hold a patent valid, if it is not infringed,
is to render a mere advisory opinion, to decide a hypothetical case.")
' 3 ' Cover, 133 F.2d at 545.
'" Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939).
'" See cases cited infra at note 162.
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which would eliminate the existence of an Article III controversy.
Second, even if the decree included an express finding of
noninfringement, that would not preclude its being given conclusive
effect in subsequent litigation because the court's finding that it had
jurisdiction is res judicata of that issue.'" There is, therefore, no con-
stitutional basis for giving full res judicata effect to consent judgments
reciting both validity and infringement, while denying conclusive
treatment to recitals of validity alone.
2. Procedural basis for the distinction
There is a firm procedural basis for refusing to give conclusive
effect to decrees adjudicating solely validity where a court is applying
collateral estoppel, and where the consent judgment entered in a pat-
ent infringement case includes an explicit finding of noninfringement.
Collateral estoppel only precludes the relitigation of those findings
which were necessary or alternative grounds of decision.' 5 " Thus, in
that validity and infringement would each be an alternate ground of
decision,'" a court should give collateral estoppel effect to both find-
ings. By contrast, a court could never give collateral estoppel effect to
a finding that the patent was valid but not infringed, because a find-
ing of validity in an infringement suit "could not conceivably have
been used as a ground of decision, either alone or as an alternative to
another ground."'"
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why these orthodox pro-
cedural rules alone cannot justify the refusal to give res judicata effect
to consent judgments adjudicating solely validity. First, the adjudica-
tion of the validity issue is often not clearly immaterial to the decision.
Consent decrees reciting only validity usually do not include an ex-
plicit finding that the defendant has not infringed.'" More often,
they are silent on the issue of infringement.'" Thus, the court may
158 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS. at 51 (2d ed. 1970).
See RESTATEMENT OE THE LAW OE JUDGMENTS § 10( I) (1942), This result comports with
the general principle that res judicata forecloses further consideration of all issues
which were or might have been litigated in the previous suit. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
Tut: LAW OF FF:DERAI, COURTS, at 51 n.8 (2c11 ed. 1970).
159 Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV, L. REv, 1, 11-12 (1942).
1 "Corier, 133 F.2d at 544-45.
let Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank,
J., concurring).
' 5 ' See, e.g., Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp.. 502 F.2d 1366, 1367-68
(7th Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 364 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. III. 1973),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974). Business Forms Finishing
Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1971), is the sole post-Lear exception. The
consent decree there included an explicit finding that plaintiff's patent was not in-
fringed. Id. at 71.
'' See, e.g., Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1367-68
(7th Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 364 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. M. 1973),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974); Butterfield v.
Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. Ill. 1971), affd per curiam, 177
U.S.P.Q. 33 (7th Cir. 1973); cf. Rialto Prods., Inc. v. Rayex Corp., 166 U.S.P.Q. 222
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
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have made no adjudication except that relating to validity. The court's
sole adjudication cannot be termed immaterial to its decision.'"
Secondly, even if the consent decree included an express finding
of noninfringement, these orthodox procedural rules would not jus-
tify the distinction unless the court was applying collateral estoppel.
While collateral estoppel effect is limited to the necessary grounds of
a decision,'" bar and merger apply to everything that was or could
have been decided.'" Thus, the fact that a finding of validity was
immaterial to a decision of noninfringement would not preclude the
application of bar and merger principles.' 67
If orthodox procedural rules, therefore, are to justify a distinc-
tion between the res judicata effect of the two types of consent judg-
ments, the court must determine that the initial decree included an
explicit finding of noninfringement and that its subsequent inquiry
into the decree's res judicata effect is governed by collateral estoppel
rather than bar and merger principles. In order to apply collateral es-
toppel rather than bar and merger principles, the court must deter-
mine that the second infringement suit in which the appellee has
raised the issue of res judicata constitutes a different cause of action
from the first action in which the consent decree was entered.'" This
inquiry is problematic because the concept of a cause of action is par-
ticularly difficult to define in the patent infringement context.'"
Slight variations in the specificity of a consent decree' 7° or in the
164 In Addressograph, the Second Circuit recognized this problem: "[wie would
find no difficulty whatever in reaching the conclusion that the consent decree in the
former suit would not operate to estop if nun-infringement had been directly adjudi-
cated therein." 156 F.2d at 485.
' 5 ' Lawlor v. National Screen Set -v. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
I66
 The bar and merger effect of a consent decree, however, is limited to what
was decided. See notes 22 supra and 168 infra. Develeipments in the Law — Res Judirata, 65
HARV. L. REv, 818, 824 (1952).
t" Addressograph, 156 F.2d at 488 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"8 1B J. Mooiw. FEDERAL PRACE[CE. 1 0.401 at 16-17 (2d ed. 1974). Bar and
merger principles operate to make a final judgment on the merits conclusive between
the parties "as to all matters that should have been litigated in reference to the same
cause of action and [do not affect) a suit on a different cause of action." Id. at 16 (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis added). Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, operates to
make determinations on matters or points which were in issue and material to the initial
judgment conclusive between the parties in other litigation involving a different cause of
action. Id. at 16-17.
'" See Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Consent Decrees
in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 Cows'. L. REV. 1322, 1344-45 (1974). "If the first
judgment grants only money damages for past infringement, creation of another copy
of the infringing device after the settlement would technically be a new cause of ac-
tion." Id. at 1345. '
170 In Business Forms Finishing Service, Inc. v. Carson, for example, the consent de-
cree was unusally restrictive: "pretrial Stipulation Exhibits A and B ... do not infringe."
452 F.2d 70, 76 (7th Cir. 1971). When the defendants began marketing a different
product, the patentee initiated a second infringement suit, based on, arguably, a new
cause of action. The court held that the consent judgment of validity should not have
conclusive effect. Id. at 75. Although the court characterized the question as whether
the consent decree created an "estoppel," it did not expressly indicate whether it was
applying bar and merger principles or collateral estoppel.
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character of products subsequently marketed by the alleged infringer
create the potential for arbitrary results as a court attempts to de-
lineate the parameters of the initial cause of action.
Because the application of collateral estoppel in patent litigation
would require a somewhat mechanistic delineation of the initial cause
of action, it is submitted that courts should not look to orthodox pro-
cedural rules for justification of their decision to give res judicata ef-
fect only to consent decrees adjudicating both validity and infringe-
ment, but instead should rely on the policy bases of that distinction.
3. Policy basis for the distinction
The Lear rationale, which mandates an authoritative testing of
patent validity, provides the central policy justification for giving con-
clusive effect only to those consent judgments which adjudicate both
validity and infringement. Because the court which enters a consent
decree does not undertake that authoritative inquiry into the validity
of a patent which is mandated by Lear, 171 only the litigants themselves
are in a position to expose the invalidity of spurious patents. Thus, an
assurance that the parties will adequately contest the issue of validity
is the only vehicle for the satisfaction of the Lear mandate in the con-
text of consented dispositions. 12 Courts have agreed that it is unlikely
that a party who defends successfully on the issue of infringement will
adequately press the issue of invalidity.'" If the defendant can easily
prove that he is nut infringing, the hypothetical validity of his
opponent's patent does not concern him.'" Indeed, a concession of its
validity would not prejudice him at air" because the patent, even in
the absence of such concession, is presumed to be valid.'" The al-
11" See text at notes '33.44 supra.
1 " See Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946),
where the court concluded that:
on grounds of public policy we ought to rule that ... either an adjudica-
tion of infringement, or a grant of some relief from which infringement
may be inferred is essential before any effect of res judicata can be given
to it on the issue of validity. In other words, ... the public interest in a
judicial determination of the invalidity of a worthless patent is great
enough to warrant the conclusion that a defendant is not estopped by a
decree of validity, at least when the decree was by consent, unless it is clear
that in the litigation resulting in the decree the issue of validity was
genuine. Id. at 485.
17 " See id.; Wallace Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 394 F. Stipp. 393, 399
(S.U.N.Y. 1975), affd, 532 1 4 ,24 846 (2d Cir. 197(1).
'" Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943).
1 °" The only possible source of prejudice is the danger that the concession of val-
idity might be given res judicata effect, thereby precluding a subsequent challenge to
the patent's validity. Assuming, however, that he already can prove that his present
conduct is not infringing the patent, this consideration is of no concern unless he plans
to manufacture different products in the future which arguably would impinge more
directly on the patentee's claims.
1 " Section 282 of the Patent Code provides that "[a] patent shall be presumed
valid [and title burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall
rest on the party asserting it." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
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leged infringer, therefore, has little incentive to contest a recital of
validity. As a result, the consent decree which adjudicates validity
alone is unlikely to represent the authoritative inquiry mandated by
Lear " 77
In contrast, the litigation which results in a concession of validity
in a decree which adjudicates both infringement and validity is more
likely to be genuine because the defendant who is losing on the issue
of infringement must contest validity in order to avoid either the is-
suance of an injunction which restrains future infringement"s or the
inclusion of a provision for what could amount to substantial liability
for past infringement. 19
 Thus, the recital of validity in a consent de-
cree which includes a finding of past infringement is less likely to val-
idate invalid patents than the same recital in a decree which does not
address the issue of infringement's° Accordingly, the Lear rationale
would suggest that only the former should receive res judicata treat-
ment.
Not only is the litigation of validity more likely to be genuine in
the case of a consent agreement adjudicating both validity and in-
fringement, but also the equities of the patentee may then be more
insistent. In decrees adjudicating solely validity, the consideration re-
ceived by the patentee may be no more substantial than what he
would have received in the Lear license situation. 1 e' These decrees
usually include nothing more than a license for prospective use and a
covenant not to contest a patent's validity.'" In the case of a consent
'" There is also a danger that the decree may reflect nothing more than the
self-interest of the parties. In Butterfield v. Oculas Contact Lens Co., for example, the
court cautioned "that the validity of a patent should not be removed from challenge by
agreement of parties who have an economic interest in it by virtue of being its owner or
a licensee under it." 332 F. Supp. 750, 760-61 (N.D. 111. 1971), affd per curiam, 177
U.S.P.Q. 33 (7th Cir. 1973). The possibility of collusion, however, has been termed a
misplaced concern in the bar and merger context. There is little incentive for collusion
since the parties cannot thereby extend a patent monopoly to third parties, nor secure
rights vis-a-vis each other which they could not confirm by contract. To Bind or Not to
Bind, note 162 supra, at 1342.
'" The court may not issue an injunction absent a finding of past or threatened
infringement. Sperti Prods., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 272 F. Supp. 441, 447-48 (D. Del.
1967), affd, 399 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1968).
'" Cf. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974,
976 (7th Cir. 1973) (settlement agreement provided that Spiller would pay Ransburg
$70,000 as compensation for Spiller's past infringement of specified Ransburg patents.)
But see Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1368-69 (7th Cir.
1974) (consent decree did not include an adjudication of infringement, but provided
fOr payment of $8,000 in settlement of all claims.)
' 8° See Addressograph, 156 F.2d at 485.
191 The only difference may be that the patent-owner may offer more favorable
royalty terms to the purported infringer with a strong case in an attempt to persuade
him to settle. Similarly, he may offer less favorable terms if he has a strong patent in
order to compensate for his outlay for legal costs expended before the signing of the
consent judgment.
1 " See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 364 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974).
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judgment which adjudicates validity and infringement, however, the
patentee may recover substantial damages for past infringement.'"
Thus, the refusal to enforce a consent decree reciting validity and in-
fringement seems more destructive of the equities of the patentee
who had won greater concessions and received more substantial con-
sideration.
Additionally, the interests of the court may be more compelling
in the case of a consent decree. adjudicating both validity and
infringement, at least where the decree enjoins further infringement.
Only consent decrees reciting both validity and infringement can sup-
port an injunction enjoining future infringement.'" The issuance of
such injunction enables the patentee to bring an action for contempt
in the event that the infringer undertakes to manufacture similar
products in the future. Entirely "independent of the equities of the
case on which the decree is founded,"'" the purpose of the contempt
proceeding is, in part, to vindicate the court's authority.' 86 Accord-
ingly, the initiation of a contempt action introduces the possibility of
criminal liability,'" increases the scope of damages," 8 and narrows
the scope of review. 188 In view of the character of a contempt pro-
ceeding, the willingness to relitigate validity in a contempt action
would be more subversive of "the plenary power of the court to en-
force its decrees,"'" than would be the reconsideration of the same
issue in a second infringement action brought by the patentee.
185 See note 179 supra.
1"4 See note ,178 supra.
"5 Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 71 F.2d 850,
851 (6th Cir. 1934), quoting Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
129 F. 105, 106 (6th Cir. 1904). See Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775,
781-82 (6th Cir, 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976).
"° United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998, 1002 n.8 (8th
Cir. 1970) (criminal contempt). See generally' Nemmers, Enforcement of Injunctive Orders
and Decrees in Patent Cases, 7 INDIANA L. REV. 287, 288-91 (1973).
1 B 7 United States ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Barco Corp., 430 F.2d 998, 999 (8th Cir.
1970).
1 " The complainant may recover any profits made by the contemnor on sales of
products in violation of the injunction against infringement. Leman v. Krender-Arnold
Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 457 (1932); Baltz v. - Walgreen Co., 198 F. Supp. 22, 26
(W.D. Tenn. 1961). In an ordinary patent infringement suit, the patentee can only re-
cover damages, and not the defendant's profits. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 504-07 (1964). The contrast may be muted by the fact
that the contemnor is not liable for punitive damages in a civil contempt proceeding.
Nemmers, Enforcement of Injunctive Orders and Decrees in Patent Cases, 7 INDIANA L. REV.
287, 306 (1973).
1 " In a contempt proceeding for violation of an injunction against infringement,
"the question is whether the accused structure is equivalent to the original in relation to
the patent in suit." Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1509 (1976), quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibreworks,
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1240, 1241 (W.D. Mich.:1972), affd per curiam, 476 F.2d 1286 (6th
Cir. 1973).
"° Wadsworth Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 71 F.2d 850,
851 (6th Cir. 1934).
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C. Viability of the Distinction
The central drawback in the application of res judicata principles
to consent judgments in patent litigation stems from the fact that the
consent decree disposes of complex issues affected with the public , in-
terest by summary agreement between the parties in a system which
depends on private litigants to vindicate the public interest and which
lacks firm safeguards against the entry of erroneous decrees. Accord-
ing res judicata effect only to those consent judgments which recite
both validity and infringement appears to offer some assurance that
the litigation as to validity is genuine because the finding of infringe-
ment obligated the defendant to press the issue of validity in order to
avoid liability. If, as it would seem, this distinction reflects practical
reality, and is not simply a theoretical nicety, then it would likely
compensate for the inadequacy of institutional safeguards against the
entry of erroneous decrees and thus offer a viable compromise be-
tween the competing patent and judicial policies.
There are three considerations which might cast doubt on. the
viability of the distinction. If the drafting of the consent decree does
not reflect the intentions of the parties, or if the distinction merely
amounts to different legal conclusions drawn from the same set of
facts or if courts were too willing to infer a finding of infringement
from the decree's grant of other relief, the distinction, in fact, may
not serve its stated purpose of indentifying those cases where the
litigation as to validity is more likely to be genuine. If the inclusion of
a finding of infringement is, as a practical matter, immaterial to the
litigants, then the distinction is an exaltation of form over substance
because it does not reflect the intention of the parties. The history of
the litigation in Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf- T-Boom Corp., 191 for
example, suggests that the contents of a consent decree may reflect
nice distinctions, in draftsmanship and not the merits of the litigation.
After the entry of the decree, the defendants, alleging attorney mis-
conduct in submission of the decree, claimed that it did not express
the true settlement agreement because they had not conceded to the
entry of an injunction restraining infringement of the plaintiff's pat-
ents and had not even become aware of the contents of the decree
until some five months after the conclusion of the suit. 192 The allega-
19 ' 362 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1966).
' 92 Id. at 319.
The defendants raised these claims five months after the entry of the consent
judgment when they filed a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 60(b) enables a court "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just" to relieve a party from a final judgment. The grounds upon which such relief may
be given include, inter alia, mistake, inadvertence, surprise or fraud. The court in Crane
Boom, however, denied the motion. 362 F.2d at 319. Then, in a subsequent contempt
action initiated by the patentee, the court, relying on Addressograph, concluded that the
consent judgment's provision for a permanent injunction constituted a grant of some
"relief from which infringement may be inferred" and held that the defendants were
bound by the consent judgment. Id.
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Lions of attorney misconduct in Crane Boom, however, indicate that this
case constitutes the exception, rather than the rule.
On the other hand, Addressograph seems more representative of
the normal process by which litigants arrive at consent agreements
and submit them to the court.'" The defendants there had rejected
the proposed decree as first submitted to them by the plaintiff be-
cause it contained an allegation that they had infringed the patent.
. The decree eventually entered by the court did not contain any find-
ing as to infringement.'" This would seem to indicate that the distinc-
tion between the two types of consent decrees is one deemed crucial
by the parties during the course of the litigation. There appears to be
little danger, therefore, that the distinction might be infirm because it
constitutes a theoretical nicety rather than a practical reality.
A second arguable infirmity of the distinction stems from the
character of patent infringement litigation. Adjudications of validity
and infringement and recitals of validity alone may amount to noth-
ing more than different legal conclusions deduced from the same
basic facts.'" A decision sustaining validity may depend on a con-
struction of the patentee's claims that is sufficiently 'narrow to avoid a
finding of infringement.' 96 Although this problem suggests that the
distinction is somewhat mechanistic, the apparent importance the par-
ties attach to the wording of the decree would seem to reaffirm the
basic viability of the distinction.
A third possible weakness of the Addressograph distinction might
arise if the courts were too willing to infer a finding of infringement
from the grant of other relief in a consent decree. The Addressograph
rule would condition res judicata treatment of a consent decree's ad-
judication of validity on the inclusion of "either an adjudication of in-
fringement, or a grant of some relief from which infringement may be
inferred ...." The inference of a finding of infringement might serve
as a vehicle for the distortion of the intentions of the parties and
thereby undercut the presumption that the finding of infringement
offers some assurance that the litigation as to validity is genuine.
However, in the few cases where a finding of infringement has been
inferred,'" the courts' interpretation of the consent decrees has not
represented the manipulations of result-oriented courts. Rather, the
courts' conclusions represented bona fide efforts to gauge the true in-
"3
 The district court in Addressograph, for example, indicated that allegations that
the consent decree was unauthorized do not rebut the presumption, on which the op-
posing party may justifiably rely, that the signing attorney was authorized to act for his
clients. 60 F. Supp. 697, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), alp, 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946).
1114 id.
Cf. Cover, 133 F.2d at 548 (Clark, J., dissenting in part).
Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Paper Mach. Co., 110 F.2d 304, 306 (3d Cir.
1940).
"7 156 F.2d at 485. (emphasis added).
"8 Kraly v, National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir.
1974); Crane Boom, 362 F.2d at 321.
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tentions of the parties to the original consent decree.' 99 Thus, their
results may be viewed as supporting the proposition that the different
types of consent decrees merit different res judicata treatment, for the
courts' efforts to interpret the provisions of a consent judgment have
served to effectuate, rather than distort, the intentions of the litigants.
CONCLUSION
The comparison between licensing agreements and consent de-
crees isolates considerations central to any decision to apply res
judicata principles to consent judgments in patent litigation. The
policies of judicial economy and the finality of litigation compete with
the public interest in encouraging and preserving challenges to patent
validity in a system which depends on private litigants to vindicate the
public interest. It is submitted that the twin dangers of validating in-
valid patents and spawning overzealous litigation by patent owners
who seek to regain the benefit of immunity lost when Lear abrogated
the doctrine of licensee estoppel suggest that consent judgments en-
tered in patent litigation should not receiye res judicata effect.
At the same time, it seems extremely unlikely that courts will re-
verse the trend in decisions and in any way denigrate the adjudicative
function of the consent process. Therefore, it would seem that the
Addressograph distinction between consent decrees adjudicating validity
atone and those reciting both validity and infringement offers a viable
compromise of the competing policy considerations. Reserving res
judicata effect for consent judgments offering some assurance that the
litigation as to validity is genuine compensates for the absence of ade-
quate safeguards against the entry of erroneous decrees, and thus
minimizes the danger of a judgment which sanctions a monopoly that
fails to meet the congressional standards of patentability.
ALEXANDRA LEAKE
1 " See Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d at 1369 n.4; Crane
Boom, 362 F.2d at 321-22. In Crane Boom, for example, the court inferred a finding of
infringement from the fact that infringement was the central issue in the prior suit, in-
junctive relief was sought and the defendants, pursuant to the consent decree, were
permanently enjoined from infringing the patents. 362 F.2d at 321-22.
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